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Abstract
Is the present economic and financial crisis similar to some previous
one? It would be so nice to prove that universality laws exist for predict-
ing such rare events under a minimum set of realistic hypotheses. First, I
briefly recall whether patterns, like business cycles, are indeed found, and
can be modeled within a statistical physics, or econophysics, framework.
I point to a simulation model for describing such so called business cy-
cles, under exo- and endo-genous conditions I discuss self-organized and
provoked crashes and their predictions. I emphasize the role of an of-
ten forgotten ingredient: the time delay in the information flow. I wonder
about the information content of financial data, its mis-interpretation and
market manipulation.
1 Introduction
The time is ripe for discussing recent economic and financial crises timing. Are
they recurrent? Is there any universality, i.e. ”universal laws”, in the physics
strict concept sense to describe such events? Are the present financial fluctua-
tions, similar or not, to the spectacular financial crashes of stock markets of past
years? How quantitative can be a warning? Can one relate economic ”theoreti-
cal models” to perceived features? Is there any manipulation of ”the” economy
and financial markets? Are there basic faults, voluntary or not, in markets and
economy policies? (The latter question reminds of some argument which at
some time claimed that the misuse of the erroneous Black-Scholes equation was
the cause of the financial crisis. But is one equation usage only to blame for the
crises that existed before the equation, - and for those which have followed?)
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There always exists the hope that mathematics can supply tools and methods
to predict when events happen, but first one needs to understand the processes
that produce them for elaborating realistic evolution equations, - and subse-
quent forecasting. Thus, economic considerations could be usefully combined
with physics models of nature. Working by analogy, econophysicists, mutatis
mutandis, introduce economic rules and interactions as basic ingredients in con-
cise models, like replacing ”spins” by ”agents”, to mimic social and economic
phenomena. Yet, even if econophysicists do control their models, of course, it is
known that complex systems generate unpredictable outcomes. However, they
present a series of general features that we can study. Whence, I will briefly
outline a few considerations on business cycles and on spectacular features like
crashes. I will insist upon subtle ingredients which are much part of present eco-
nomic life, though they existed also much before, i.e. information flow, market
manipulations by active agents and by media or politicians.
2 So called cycles
Let us start with some optimistic thought leading to things not necessarily much
discussed, though supposedly of common knowledge : ”things will go better”.
This is equivalent to the classical statement that ”the darkest hour of all is the
hour before day”; equivalently, in french, ”apre`s la pluie, le beau temps”. A
mere meteorological evidence, of no quantitative forecasting value. Necessarily,
indeed, after a recession, will come prosperity.
To improve such views, one has imagined to quantify ”business cycles”, i.e.,
merely the durations of recession and prosperity time intervals and frequencies.
Since 1930 or so, observations of ”cycles” had led Kalecki [1] to write about a
macrodynamic theory of business cycles. Let Gabsich and Zarnowitz books or
Aoki contribution [2, 3, 4] be also mentioned, but there are many other relevant
works and many controversies [5] to be but which have been much discussed.
However, it is extremely hard for a physicist to accept the existence of such
features as being a cycle, when there are about a little bit more than 100, or
even 200, data points, and when the deduced cycle period is about 35, or 55,
years, - with large, not to say huge, error bars on this ”period” value. Business
cycles are still theoretical concepts. NO theory can predict the time interval
size of a recession or prosperity; still less its day, or even month, of beginning
or end.
2.1 Duration distributions
Yet, following recent practical use of statistical physics concepts in financial
matters, Ormerod and Mounfield [6] analyzed Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
data of 17 leading capitalist economies from 1870 to 1994 and concluded that
the frequency of the duration of recessions is consistent with a power law.
The data analysis was challenged by Wright [7] who concluded that the data
was consistent with an exponential (Boltzmann-Gibbs) law. The controversy
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might stems, as already hinted here above, from the number of data points used
in measuring the shortest time intervals for a recession.
Thus, do the recession duration distribution follows a power law or an ex-
ponential law [8]? An extended set of GDP data was examined in [8]. It was
concluded that a power law led to a better fit than an exponential law over the
extended data set. It seemed of interest also to examine prosperity duration.
Interestingly, the distribution was found to follow a power law [8].
Thus, the arguments of Ormerod and Mounfield about the duration fre-
quency of recessions might be recalled, if not fully approved or considered to
be exhaustive: the authors proposed that economic management often prevents
recessions lasting for more than 1 year, but if they do last longer, then subjec-
tive expectations of growth become depressed and recessions may then occur
on all scales of duration, resulting in a power law. They proposed, therefore,
that the distribution of such patterns is not determined by a common set of
causal factors for all durations, but instead there is a breakdown of scaling for
recessions with short duration. Question: can these ideas be extended to the
cases of prosperity epochs?
Note that often there is some perception difference between the psychological
or even visual data filtering based on the slowest trend, - mathematically, a large
window-moving average, and the actual results from statistical analyses, looking
at somewhat high frequency data.
2.2 Pulse destabilization
Considering that the economy is basically a bistable (recession/prosperity) sys-
tem, it was suggested [6] that a characteristic (de)stabilization model be con-
sidered. There are many possible theoretical ones, but each should lead to a
characteristic (de)stabilization time, in order to be of conceptual value.
However, let it be emphasized that from an economic point of view this type
of pulse time values should not be confused with the apparent periodicity (or
better periodicities) of business cycles [1, 2, 3, 4], closely related to what can be
called a relaxation time, in physics. A pulse (force) duration much differs from
the time during which the force strength will have some measurable effect [9, 10].
Note that the pulse application anticipates an up or down turn, or sometimes an
acceleration or a deceleration [11, 12]. By ”how much?”, is a pertinent question.
It depends on the pulse strength and its duration, and moreover on what state
it is applied, - since the system is always in a dynamic equilibrium!
Marchetti [13] had observed cycles and pulses behavior of economic indica-
tors, leading to ”business cycle” features, after correlating them to physical and
other patterns of social behavior, rather than to money indicators, - with a pe-
riod of about 55 years for at least two centuries. The patterns can be expressed
in close mathematical form permitting quantitative forecasts to be made. Along
such a psychological line of expectations for economy periods, Hohnisch et al.
[14] discussed the ups and downs of opinions about recessions and prosperity
within a Glauber dynamics evolution frame [15, 16, 17] of a Blume-Capel model
[18, 19, 20], which in brief describes ”spin 1” particles. Their computer sim-
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ulations show that opinions drastically undergo changes from one equilibrium
to the other, both having rough but small fluctuations, - as in stochastically
resonant-like systems. These opinion swings are random events like radioactive
decay, and thus presumably exponentially distributed.
The (observed) power laws [6, 8] thus indicate some coupling between suc-
cessive swings, which is missing in the simple computer model of Hohnisch et
al. (Similarly, the simple random walk model of Bachelier 1900 gives a Gaus-
sian or log-normal distribution of the price fluctuations, and the actually ob-
served power law distribution needs a non-random explanation, like psycho-
logical herding etc.). Some further discussion of the meaning of exponential
versus power law decays thus would be appropriate, but is outside the scope of
the present comments. One attempt, seen as an inverse problem, should be to
invent stochastic time series with appropriate structures as in [21, 22].
Note that there are asymmetries in the prosperity and recession sections,
with different statistical characteristics. There are also more subsections in the
prosperity than in the recession time intervals. This asymmetry much com-
plicates the analysis. Is it time to suggest further work ion the matter? One
could make a Detrended Fluctuation Analysis [23, 24, 25], or use other related
techniques [26, 27, 67, 68]. This would allow to take into account that overall
the Western world had economic growth in the last half century, characterized
by a time-averaged growth rate G per year or per quarter. Then a time interval
with actual growth above (or below) G could be counted as prosperity (or as a
recession). In this way, the distribution and its analysis would be perhaps better
suited to finer details, as the fluctuations and their correlations. Quite recently,
I showed thatsuch fluctuations in a G averaged over finite time intervals can
reveal trends and superposed humps, in some financial data, - surprisingly with
regular evolutions of the time interval durations [28].
In concluding this section, I wish to indicate that such successions of reces-
sions and prosperity periods, thus so called business cycles, have pushed several
of us into a renewed deal of attention, from analytical and simulation points of
view [4, 29, 30, 31].
2.3 ACP model: a Reactive Lattice Gas
In particular, in the so called ACP model [29], one simplifies economic rules to
simulate the behaviour of economic systems in changing conditions, e.g. political
changes or destruction of economy barriers [29, 32, 33]. This is similar to a
Boltzmann approach in which the gas particles are called companies, but this
can also be only a name for any economic variable [31]. The company ”degree
of freedom” (its particle efficiency or fitness f) can be coupled to an external
field F , describing the political or /and economic environment. Beside the field,
there is some selection pressure sel, which acts as an inverse temperature in a
thermodynamic sense [29].
Economy entities were initially randomly placed on a square symmetry lat-
tice. We have also considered a world divided into three regions characterized
by different taxes, or economic rules [32]. Three possible events determine the
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evolution of the system:
• a company i survives with the probability pi = e
−sel ‖fi−F‖;
• each company can move on the lattice (horizontally or vertically) one
lattice step at a time, if a free space is available;
• if companies ”meet” they can set a new firm or can merge; the decision
is taken through the strategy parameter b, which is the probability of
merging. Since the creation of company is a complementary event the
settlement probability is 1− b.
The f value of the new firm was considered to be obtained according to
various types of memories depending on the f of the company parents. Results
of variants of such a model indicate the possibility of finding business cycles
[30, 33]. Moreover, in order to investigate the role of the time delay in informa-
tion flow, the model was adapted to the Ising model of financial markets [34]
by introducing interactions between the stock market and the economy as well
as the time delay in the information transfer about the economy state [35, 36].
Further work should lead to determine some (de)stabilization time and to more
quantitative results for mapping economic reality to the model, i.e. to better
describe in an economic way, how the parameters F , fi and sel can be de-
duced and more precisely defined, from considerations on ”manufacturing” and
”agricultural” sectors, ”production factors”, like ”entrepreneurs” and ”unskilled
labour” , as, e.g., in the Footloose Capital model [37] and its extensions.
3 Financial crashes
3.1 Endogenous vs. Exogenous crashes
Going to the argument of predictability, one has to touch upon the notion of
self-organization [38] and of external field influence. In fact, the lack of uni-
versality of crises is likely to be found in differences between endogenous and
exogenous origins of interactions between agents under their environment con-
straints, modulated by media information and other agents, inducing different
reactions [39, 40, 41]. There is much quantitative difference between endo and
exo-genous effects. E.g., a simple concise case which I studied is that of sales
in which one can show different relaxation times [42]. Endogenous effects are
partially due to psychological impacts of traders and financial manipulators.
Not only. Of course, they went to different economic schools. If they went to
school, of course they learned different theories, and their gurus forced them
into being devoted followers or original contrarians. Exogenous effects empha-
size similarity in reactions. Of course, at the microscopic level, people will react
in different ways, to an earthquake or a tsunami, but globally the same herding
behavior is found. We are educated, told, informed to copy others; yet, there
are sometimes contrarians, who thus make ”live” evolving in a stochastic way.
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The same in economy and finance. Everyone necessarily relies on information
for behaving.
Nowadays those informations are much quantified; I do not claim that all
computers in all trading firms are based on the same codes, but they rely on sim-
ilar informations, and regularly accepted theoretical rules. There are variations,
but the sell-buy mechanism is intrinsically accepted as the basic ingredient of
the financial system, and the instantaneous balance between trades is a strong
hypothesis. Of course, there is a relative importance of agents, more than of
news, in the evolution of the markets, because one follows ”big shots” behaviors.
Note that leaders can also manipulate in order to win, - see below.
Computers are supposed to quasi react in the same way. However, in most
model, time delay in the information flow is very often missing. Yet, it is
one cause of automatic amplification effects, which are crucial at crises times.
Reaction synchronization in crisis or in non-crisis ”periods” differs for both
exogenous and endogenous crash cases. Fast oscillations are superimposed on
low evolutions, or the other way around, as easily understood, but with markedly
different time scales. To remain in a sort of ”equilibrium dynamics framework
model” of markets, and use physics vocabulary, let us write : Similarly, to
phase transitions in thermodynamics, one can imagine that a self-organized
crash should be independent of external fields, and be typically deterministic,
yet containing some uncertainty. However, manipulations can be thought of as
external fields.
That is why, when the endogenous multiplicative effect prevails over exoge-
nous causes that one can predict crashes. This was markedly obvious when the
Oct. 27, 1997 crash was predicted several months in advance [43, 44, 45, 46, 47],
the warning signals being extremely similar to the Oct. 19, 1987 crash analyzed
in [48, 49] through the log-periodic functional form
y(t) = A+B
(
tc − t
tc
)−m [
1 + C
(
ω ln
(
tc − t
tc
)
+ φ
)]
(t < tc). (1)
where tc is the crash-time or bubble rupture point, - the other symbols being
parameters, which can even, by analogy, receive some reasonable interpretation
[50]. The same oscillatory pattern before a divergence-like behavior also occurs
for the 1929 crash(es). This is as if the market is a physical system at an
equilibrium second order phase transition but evolving under non-equilibrium
conditions [51, 52, 53].
No consensus exists about the precise (economic or financial) causes, of such
types of crashes, but the fits to the financial indices fluctuations are remarkable
[54, 55, 56]. A longer, but still incomplete, list of references can be found in
[57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62]. This suggests that for several crashes some underlying
”structural” mechanism exists [63, 64]. It is conjectured that this holds for self-
organising-like systems. In the case of exogenous effects, unexpected or under
manipulation, the universal law, Eq.(1), or its variant [47], has not to hold, -
see e.g. what has been recently observed and is outlined here below.
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3.2 Cerdeira index
Obviously, the question still remains on whether one can be identifying bubbles
and subsequent financial crises in real time. To do so, see [65] and [66]. E.g.,
a measure, called the area variation rate (AVR) index, has been introduced to
study the behavior of financial time series in [66]. The index is defined as the
”normalized (free) energy” variation, deduced from a sort of ”specific heat” inte-
gration over ”time windows”, as in a multifractal approach [67, 68]. This method
permits to distinguish and identify rare events, like major financial crises, as the
(Oct. 24) 1929 Black Thursday and the (Oct. 19) 1987 Black Monday market
crashes and the 2008 Subprime crisis. The analysis has forecasting capabilities,
as it has been demonstrated when applying the method to the 2011 market
fluctuations. From these results, it appears in fact that the 2011 crisis seems
of a different nature from the other three here above mentioned [66]. Should
I dare conjecturing that, beside market manipulation, - see below, a structural
cause might be the value of the information flow time delay at the various (=
different) crisis epochs?
4 Market manipulation
4.1 Market manipulation by agents
Some market manipulation in the financial crisis has been recently evidenced
[69].
An analysis of financial industry data, Citigroup’s stock, has shown an
anomalous increase in borrowed shares at some time, - the selling of which being
a large fraction of the usual total trading volume. Such a selling of borrowed
shares could not be explained by news events, as there was no corresponding
increase in selling by share owners. However a similar number of shares, as the
borrowed ones, was returned on a single day six days later. The magnitude and
coincidence of borrowing and returning of shares (of Citigroup’s) is evidence of
a concerted effort to drive down Citigroup’s stock price and achieve a profit.
On the other hand, I have come across ”obvious” insider trading in one case,
based on a DFA data analysis , - I confess it, leading to some personal financial
loss. But can a judge rely on an econophysicist suprising finding?, - and could
such an analysis be published, as a scientific fact?
It is accepted or admitted as ”common knowledge” that markets are not
sufficiently transparent to reveal or prevent market manipulation events, like a
”bear raid,” or insider trading. Note, however, that an appropriate regulation,
repealed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in July 2007, the so called
”uptick rule”, was designed to prevent such market manipulations and even
promote so called stability. It was in force from 1938 as a key part of the
government response to the 1929 market crash and its aftermath. Not any
more. It might be reinstated, see http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uptick−rule.
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4.2 Market manipulation by media
The following stems from a private communication by D. Stauffer [70].
Media present Germany as debt-free prigs, and even described Germany as
the model of debt delimitation. In reality, according to the Statistics Office of
the European Commission, Eurostat, more than two thirds of the 27 states of
the European Union have less national debt (with respect to the Gross Domestic
Product) than Germany.
In the spring of 2010, Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel suggested in ”Bild
am Sonntag that permanent ”Schuldensu¨nder” should loose their national right
to vote in Europe; neither the chancellor nor ”Bild” added that Germany should
be part of them. Why? ... because they did not know the data, or because
they knew that the German people did not know it? The more so, since former
chancellor Helmut Schmidt had written in ”Die Zeit”, in 2011, that only one
country fulfilled the two Maastricht criteria (60 percent of debts, and 3 percent
yearly new indebtedness = deficit). In fact, 5 European Union states do so:
Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Denmark and (only for 2011) Bulgaria.
According to Eurostat, in 2011 (provisionally), in the European Union, the
highest national debt ratios were: Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Belgium,
France, Great Britain, Germany, and Hungary.
When, in April 2011, Eurostat released the provisional statistics for 2010,
only ”Die Welt” among the most important (german) newspapers published
them. ”Der Spiegel” brought the 2011 crisis as a cover story, but wrote more
about Greece than about Germany. Finally, in the fall of 2011, newspapers
reported in detail an alleged false estimation of the German national debt, as
being ”small”, which was in reality around 55 billions euro.
Of course, media do report dissenting voices: the Luxembourg Minister-
Pra¨sident and Chairman of the Euro group, Karl Juncker claimed that Germany
has more state debts in percent of the GDP than Spain. Moreover, in one
interview with ”Der Spiegel” (p. 71, in the 07/2012 issue) financier George
Soros said that: ”Germany was one of the states, which freely offended the
(Maastricht criteria)”. However, media are prone to moderate such remarks.
E.g. ”Der Spiegel” countered: Germany has occasionally overdone the three-
percent limit in the budgetary deficit.
All this to show how on a specific, but highly political case, media can (by
omission or for some other reason which cannot be written here) induce a false
vision of a (financial, here) situation.
5 CONCLUSION
Events such as business cycles, market crashes and economic crises are ubiqui-
tous and generate anxiety and panic difficult to control. Explaining, preventing
or forecasting them has been the chimera for many economists, politicians and
even scientists who have devoted much of their work to the matter. To describe
these events, one needs to take into account an enormous number of ... un-
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known variables. However, this does not impede anyone from finding temporal
correlations or patterns in the interesting time series.
Moreover physics intuition and ad hoc statistical models may give some
hint on the main highlights because of the pertinent quantification of so called
stylized facts. My impression, nevertheless, is that sound scientific work has
to fight, and will have often to fight, against (scientific or not) tradition and
political constraints.
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